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Abstract
The problem of finding the minimal tipping set in a super modular game is known to be NP-hard. In this paper, we derive an 
approximation algorithm to find a minimal tipping set. In the special case of the uniform game, the approximation provides the
exact result.
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1. Introduction
With ever growing dependency through commerce and communication between various parts of the globe, there 
is a greater need for the analysis and understanding of interdependent security (IS) among interacting agents. IS has 
been successfully modeled using the framework of n-person (non-cooperative) game theory [1]. In a series of 
seminal papers [2][3][4], Heal and Kunreuther (hereafter H-K) describe these models and their applications to 
airline security as well as vaccination games to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, etc. In particular, the 
models are used for airline baggage security policy adoption.  The special features of this model include the 
following: (a) each player is endowed with only two pure strategies or actions, invest - (1), and not invest - (0) in 
security measures; (b) the players are not allowed to use randomized strategies which in turn implies that we are 
interested only in the Nash equilibria (NE) in pure strategies [5]; (c) the utility (negative of the cost) function for 
each player has two components, first is due to one's own action (1 or 0) and the second is due to the action (1 or 0) 
of the other players. This second component is called the externality component, which in turn decides the level of 
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interdependency among the players; and (d) a subset of players acting in collusion, by the clever choice of their own 
actions, can influence the externalities of other players not in the coalition so as to force them to change their choice 
of actions. This phenomenon, whereby one subset can exert influence over another is called tipping [6][7] or 
cascading [8].
A condition for an n-person game to exhibit the tipping / cascading property is that the payoff (loss) function of 
the players must satisfy the increasing (decreasing) differences property. This property is intimately associated with 
the super-modularity of the utility functions [3][9] In this paper we work with the differences in the losses, which 
are the negation of the payoff differences.
Super-modular functions and functions with increasing differences are defined on lattices [9]. In our case, the 
underlying binary lattice is defined by the 2n binary strings of 1's and 0's under the natural partial order defined 
over the binary strings. It turns out this binary lattice is also a binary hypercube of dimension n. See Figure 1a for an 
example of a four dimensional lattice which is also a four dimensional binary cube.
H-K were the first to analyze the tipping phenomenon in the context of interdependent security games that arise 
in the context of airline security games [2][4]. By concentrating on n-airline security games with two NE - one at 
0n and one at 1n they proved the existence of a minimal tipping set. However, it turns out that the problem of 
finding a minimal tipping set is combinatorially difficult [4] and no viable algorithm is yet known. This difficulty is 
a result of (n-1)! different paths connecting the NE at 0n with that at 1n . In this paper we propose an 
approximation algorithm for finding a locally minimal tipping set. Our method exploits the topological properties of 
the underlying binary hypercube by enumerating the O(n) node disjoint path distribution in the binary lattice which 
is also a binary hypercube.[10]
The basic game model is given in Section 2. The complexity of the problem of finding the minimal tipping set is 
described in section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of our approximation algorithm's candidate path selection. 
An example is contained in section 5 and an algebraic method to calculate a minimal tipping set from the candidate 
sets is described in Section 6. The special case of uniform games is analyzed in Section 7 and another example 
provided. A short summary of the paper is given in Section 8.
Figure 1: (a)State Lattice (b)Interdependence Graph
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Table 1: 3 Player Losses
2 The Game Model 
There are n players labeled 1 through n, each endowed with two pure strategies denoted by 1 (invest) and 0 ( not 
invest). A play s is defined by the n-tuple s  (s1,,s2,...,sn ) where si {0,1} denotes the choice of pure strategy 
E\SOD\HUin. There are a total of 2n distinct plays denoted by S  {s | s  (s1,s2,...,sn ),si {0,1}}. For 
a,b䌜SGHILQHDELQDU\UHODWLRQDVIROORZV&OHDUO\:HVD\ab (or ba ) when aibiIRUin. It can be 
verified that the pair (SLVDSRVHWDQGLVLQGHHGDFRPSOHWHODWWLFH>9]. Let u:sĺRn where 
u(s)  (u(1s),u2(s),...,un (s)) denote the n-tuple of utility functions with ui:SĺR denoting the utility of the 
player i. The game is specified by (S,u). Let síi denote a play (s1,...,si _1,*,si1,...,sn ) and (síi,1i) denote the play 
(s1,,...,si _1,1i,si1,...,sn ). The game (S,u) is super-modular[9] if, for every i,
ui(s'íi,1i)íui(s'íi,0i)ui(síi,1i)íui(síi,0i)
when s'íisíi. Intuitively, this decreasing difference condition states that the loss for player i to change from 
strategy 0 to 1 does not increase when a subset of the other players has already moved from 0 to 1.
We now define the airline security game which is predicated on the natural assumption that a player can die no 
more than once [2]. The utility, or the pay-off, is defined in terms of losses. Let ci>0 be the cost of investment 
(choice of strategy 1) in security by player i, Li>0 be the cost or loss due to a catastrophic incident, pi>0 be the 
probability that player i will suffer a catastrophic loss due to his own inaction (choice of strategy 0) and qij
(qij) be the probability that player j will suffer a catastrophic loss due to inaction of player i. For later 
reference, define an n×n matrix Q=[qij] with qii=0. Clearly, the off-diagonal elements of Q define the 
interdependency among the n players. It can be shown [4] that where u
(1)
i is the average cost due to self action and 
u
(2)
i is the average cost due to the action of others, the total expected cost is given by: 
ui(s)=u
(1)
i (s)+u
(2)
i (s) (2)
u
(1)
i (s)=sici+(ísi)piLi (3)
ui
(2)  (1 (1 si)pi)(1 jz i,(1 (1 s j )q ji))Li (4)
Play\Cost Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
000 p1  L1  (1  p1)* (q21  q31  q21q31)L1 p2  L2  (1 p2) * (q12  q32  q12q32)L2 p3  L3  (1 p3) * (q13  q23  q13q23)L13
001 p1L1  (1 p1) *q21L1 p2L2  (1 p2) *q12L2 c3  (q13  q23  q13q23)L3
010 p1L1  (1 p1) *q31L1 c2  (q12  q32  q12q32)L2 p3L3  (1 p3) *q13L3
011 p1L1 c2  q12L2 c3  q13L3
100 c1  (q21  q31  q21q31)L1 p2L2  (1 p2) *q32L2 p3L3  (1 p3) *q23L3
101 c1  q21L1 p2L2 c3  q23L3
110 c1  q31L1 c2  q32L2 p3L3
111 c1 c2 c3
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where Ȇ
k
i=1ai=a1a2...ak refers to the product of the ai. An example of a three person game is given in Table 1. 
3 Complexity of Tipping in a Super modular game 
Analysis of tipping is concerned with the difference
ui(síi1i)íui(síi0i)
where (síi,1i,síi,0i) is an edge in the complete lattice considered as a binary hypercube. A sequence of differences 
along a path in the binary hypercube connecting the NE at 0n to the one at 1n is given by
ui(0
ní1i)íui(0
ní0i)ui(0
ní1i1j)íui(0
ní1i0j)ui(1
ní1i)íui(1
ní0i) (4)
Since 0n and 1n are NE, clearly ui(0
ní1i)íui(0
ní0i)>0 and ui(1
ní1i)íui(1
ní0i)<0. That is, the above 
sequence of decreasing real numbers starts from a positive value and ends up at a negative value. Thus there is a 
zero crossing point that corresponds to a subset {k1,...,ki} players choosing pure strategy 1. But there are (ní
distinct sequences corresponding to (níGLVMRLQWSDWKVLQWKHXQGHUO\LQJK\SHUFXEH+HQFHZHJHt (níVXEVHWV
one for each path. The minimal tipping set is then to be derived from those sets. Hence, the problem of finding the 
minimal tipping set is NP-hard.
HK proved that for the special case satisfying two conditions (player and state independence assumptions) there 
exists a minimal tipping set. Recently, Cremeans et. al. [11] gave a simpler algorithm to find such a tipping set for 
this special case.
In this paper, our goal is to find an approximation to the minimal tipping set for the general case.
4 An Approximation algorithm 
We can exploit the lattice / hypercube structure of the game states examined in [12] to sample possible solutions.  
Recall that a given decreasing sequence of inequalities of the differences in the losses uniquely induces a mapping 
of the sequences in (4) onto edges in the binary hypercube of dimension n as follows:
(0n -11i,0
n10i)
1
! (0n -21i11,0
n20i11)
2
! (0n -31i1112,0
n30i1112)... 
n1
! (1n -11i,1
n10i)
where clearly (0ní1i,0
ní0i)is an edge in the binary hypercube [10]. Thus, one end (say the right end) of the 
starting edge in the above sequence of edges traces a path living entirely in one sub-cube of dimension(níZKRVH
ith bit is fixed at 0, namely
0n _10i o
1
0n _ 20i11o
2
0n _ 30i1112... o
(n1)
1n _10i
This path is from the NE 0ní0i to a neighbor 1
ní0i of the NE 1
n. Similarly, the left end traces a corresponding 
path in the complementary sub-cube of dimension níGHILQHGE\ith bit equal to 1, namely
0n _11i o
1
0n _ 21i11o
2
... o
(n1)
1n _11i (5)
Here we have a path from the neighbor 0ní1i of the NE at 0
n to the NE at 1n. Our approximation algorithm relies 
on the well-known topological property of node disjoint path distribution in a binary hypercube.
Theorem 4.1 [10]: Let x and y be nodes in a binary hypercube of dimension k where the Hamming distance 
between x and y, H(x,y)=r IRUVRPHrk. Then (a) there are exactly r node disjoint paths each of length r between 
x and y (b) there are exactly (kír) node disjoint paths each of length r+2 and (c) The set of all paths in groups a and 
b are node disjoint.
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We apply this theorem to the two nodes x=0ní1iand y=1
ní1i with Hamming distance is níLQWKHVXE-cube
of dimension níZKRVHith bit is fixed at 1. Therefore, there are k=r=n-1 node disjoint paths each of length níLQ
that sub-cube.
Thus, if we denote the path in (5) succinctly as 
0ní0i{1,2,...,ní`
ní0i
where the {} term is the order of dimensions along which you move to the next node in the path from 0ní0i to 
1ní0i. It can be shown [10] that by left circular shift the elements in the ordered set we can generate the n-1 node 
disjoint paths in the n-1 dimensional sub-cube. These are given by
0n10i
1 2 3 ... n  2 n 1
2 3 4 ... n 1 1
3 4 5 ... 1 2
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
n 1 1 2 ... n  3 n  2
­
®
°
°
°
°
¯
°
°
°
°
½
¾
°
°
°
°
¿
°
°
°
°
1n10i
Likewise there is a corresponding sequence of paths in the other sub-cube given by
0n11i
1 2 3 ... n  2 n 1
2 3 4 ... n 1 1
3 4 5 ... 1 2
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
n 1 1 2 ... n  3 n  2
­
®
°
°
°
°
¯
°
°
°
°
½
¾
°
°
°
°
¿
°
°
°
°
1n11i
Thus, for each player i, there are níGLVWLQFWLQFUHDVLQJVHTXHQFHVRILQHTXDOLWLHVWKDWVWDUWIURPDQHJDWLYHQXPEHU
and end in a positive number. Hence, for all n players, there are a total of n(ní)=O(n2) sequences and hence )O(n2
subsets of players who are potential candidates for the tipping set. Our goal is to find a minimal tipping set from 
these O(n2) candidate subsets. 
5 An Example 
Consider an example of a n=4 player airline game with the following values of the parameters: 
Li  1000,: ci  99,: pi  0.1 IRUDOOiDQGWKHPDWUL[RIqij’s given by
q=
¬
«
«
ª
¼
»
»
º0.99.02.02
1 0 0 0
0.99 0 .02
0.99.02 0
Then using the expressions (2),(3), and (4) we can readily compute the 16×4 payoff (or loss in our case) table for 
each of the 24=16 plays for each of the 4 players. For lack of space, we will not explicitly show this table. It can be 
verified that for this choice of parameter values, 04 and 14 are two NE with 14 being better than 04. 14 is Pareto 
optimal in this case. Applying the approximation algorithm developed in Section 4, we get three disjoint sequences 
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of inequalities induced by the three node disjoint paths for Player 1 as follows. Referring to the binary hypercube in 
Figure1a the first disjoint sequence is given by
u1(1000)íu1(0000)u1(1100)íu1(0100)u1(1110)íu1(0110)u1(1111)íu1(0111)
ZKLFKIRUWKHDERYHH[DPSOHEHFRPHVííí
It follows that {2} is a candidate tipping set for player 1. That is, if player 2 changes his strategy from 0 to 1, 
some other players can reduce their losses by switching from 0 to 1. Thus, player 2 has influence over other those 
other players
Similarly, the second sequence
u1(1000)íu1(0000)u1(1001)íu1(0001)u1(1101)íu1(0101)u1(1111)íu1(0111)
which for the above example becoPHVíí
from which we get {2,4} as a candidate tipping set. From the third sequence 
u1(1000)_ u1(0000)u1(1010)_ u1(0010)u1(1011)_ u1(0011)u1(1111)_ u1(0111)
ZKLFKOHDGVWRí
from which we get {2,3,4} as a candidate tipping set.
By repeating the above procedure for Players 2, 3, and 4, we can obtain three candidate tipping sets for each of 
the players, which is summarized in Table 2
Table 2: 
candidate tipping sets Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
T1 {2} {2,4} {2,3,4}
T2 {1,3,4} {1,3,4} {1,3,4}
T3 {1,2,4} {1,4} {1,2,4}
T4 {1,2,3} {1,3} {1,2,3}
Our goal is to find a minimal tipping set from these n(ní FDQGLGDWHWLSSLQJVHWV
In the following Section, we describe a simple algebraic method for extracting a minimal tipping set.
6 An Algebraic Method 
Previously in [11] we transformed similar facts about state independent games into a graph form to examine the 
influence patterns. We constructed these influence graphs by representing each player by a node i with an edge from 
player 2 to player 1 if player 2’s choice to invest impacts or influences player 1 directly. 
Generating such a graph for this example gives us the graph in Figure 1b. General super modular games lack 
some of the structure we exploited in state independent games. Unlike state independent games, one node’s 
influence is not enough to tip given node. In this example, all of the influencing nodes are needed to tip a node, thus 
adding complexity. To address this added challenge, we have developed an algebraic method for finding a minimal 
tipping set. 
/HWȈ ^`OHWDQGGHQRWHWKHXVXDOORJLFDO$1'DQG25RSHUDWRUVUHVSHFWLYHO\)RU simplicity, a*b is 
denoted by ab7KHQȈGHILQHVDFRPPXWDWLYHVHPL-ring. For all a,b䌜ȈZHKDYHa+a=a, aa=a,
a+ab=a(1+b)=a.
Let a,b,c,d be the four binary variables corresponding to players 1 though 4 respectively. We now encode a 
subset {1,2,4} of players by abd. Accordingly, the information in Table 2 can be encoded as follows:
T1=b+bd+bcd=b
T2=acd+acd+acd=acd
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T3=abd+ad+abd=ad (6)
T4=abc+ac+abc=ac
These expressions represent the conditions for each player to choose to invest. T1 gives the conditions for player a,
T2, for b, and so on.
First, we can algorithmically trim the number of players to examine. While this is not needed in order to get an 
answer, it improves both the accuracy of the approximation and the typical run time. 
1) Any case in which a player’s action is determined entirely by a single other player, we can collapse those 
players. In the context of the game, this is because the influences of the impacting player contain the influences of 
the impacted player. In this example, b completely determines the action of a. This means that the impact of b
contains the entire impact of a, and that when picking minimal tipping sets, there is no reason to pick a. Collapsing a
into b requires moving a’s influences to b. This is to make sure that b now influences all players that a previously 
did. This should be done one at a time in order to stop cycles when a node is influenced only by itself. 
If no such players exist, we simply move on to the next step. Then from (6) we get:
T2=bcd;T3=bd;T4=bc
2) We also do not want to double count a player. If a player is externally motivated to invest, we do not care about 
the conditions to tip that player. To reflect this, we add to each expression the set consisting only of that player. This 
yields:
T2=b+bcd=b;T3=c+bd;T4=d+bc
Now we are ready for the core procedure. We want the value of each of these expressions to be 1, which is the same 
as their product being 1. Thus we want to find the minimal subset variables to set to 1 such that T2*T3*T4=1.
Substituting from above we get:
(b)(c+bd)(d+bc)=(bc+bd)(d+bc)=(bcd+bc+bd+bcd)=1
Thus we have candidate tipping sets of bcd,:bc,:bd:bcd. Any of these will give a tipping set, but since we are 
interested in minimal tipping sets, we take one of the smaller sets bc or bd. to choose for our minimum set.
7 The Uniform Case 
One special form of the Airline Security game is the uniform case. In this case, the agents behave identically with 
pi=pj=p,ci=cj=c,Li=Lj=L,qij=qkl=q
By examining the behavior of the approximations in this case along with the case’s properties, we gain some insight 
regarding the performance of the method.  Full proofs are omitted for space, but are available in the full report.  The 
most relevant property of the uniform game is the following:
Lemma 7.1: A uniform game can be tipped by any set S of players with |S|>níí
log(c/pL)
log(íq) .
Corollary 7.1: In the uniform game, there can be no cascades. 
Lemma 7.2: The hypercube left shift sampling will find a set of n-1 groups of |S| consecutive players to tip each 
individual player.
Theorem: Given the above a uniform game and n-1 groups of |S| players tipping each single player, the 
algebraic simplification will find the optimal solution.
Example
Now we look at how the approximation system behaves in this context. Since any k players will tip any player. 
For players a,b,c, and d, set the following parameters:
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p=0.1,c=99,q=.009,L=1000
For clarity, examine what happens when |S|=2. This means that any 2 players will tip any player, thus each player’s 
set of candidate tipping sets will be the first two corrected players and the corresponding first two from every left 
shift. So for players a,b,c,d, we would have:
a:bc,cd,bd ; b:cd,ad,ac ; c:ab,bd,ad ; d:ab,bc,ac
Now, when we apply the algebraic method on this set, we get:
a=a+bc+cd+bd ; b=b+cd+ad+ac ; c=c+ab+bd+ad ; d=d+ab+bc+ac
This system of equations simplify as:
a*b*c*d=1
(a+bc+cd+bd)(b+cd+ad+ac)(c+ab+bd+ad)(d+ab+bc+ac)=1
(ab+ad+ac+bc+cd+bd)(cd+bc+ac+ab+bd+ad)=1
ab+ad+ac+bc+cd+bd=1
This finds several size 2 tipping sets, which is the optimal. 
8. Conclusions
The problem of finding the minimal tipping set in a general n-person super modular games that arise in the 
context of airline security with two NE consists of two steps. First, is to enumerate (n-1)! distinct paths for the edges 
in the complete binary lattice (hypercube) of dimension n. Second is to process the resulting (n-1)! candidate sets to 
obtain the minimal tipping set. Clearly, both the steps can take exponential time.  In this paper, we have given an 
algorithm to enumerate a set of O(n) node disjoint paths to obtain O(n) candidate sets by exploiting the topological 
properties of the underlying binary hypercube. Using a simple algebraic method, we then reduce these candidate sets 
into a single tipping set, which is an approximation of the minimal tipping set. The approximation is then shown to 
be optimal in the case of uniform airline security games.  Efforts to quantify the quality of this approximation of 
the tipping set are currently under way.
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